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Notes and Comments
New York v. Quarles: Safety First?
In Miranda v. Arizona,1 the United States Supreme Court
required police officers to advise suspects of their rights2 during
custodial interrogation.3 Recently, in New York v. Quarles,4 the
Supreme Court announced a "public safety" exception to the
landmark rule of Miranda. The Supreme Court in Quarles held
that considerations of public safety excused a failure to provide
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. In Miranda, the Court required that: "Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
3. Custodial situations include those in which an individual is "deprived of his free-
dom ...in any significant way ... " Id. at 478.
Although the Court in Miranda provided this definition of "custodial interrogation"
many subsequent cases interpret this definition. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341 (1976), the Supreme Court found that one was not in custody when he was interro-
gated in his home during the course of an internal revenue investigation. In Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), on the other hand, the Supreme Court held that one was in
custody when he was interrogated in his bedroom after being awaked by four police of-
ficers. In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court determined that
one who was questioned in jail regarding a crime other than the one for which he was
presently incarcerated was "in custody" within the meaning of Miranda. Some courts
have found that one is in custody if he has a reasonable belief that he is not free to leave.
See, e.g., United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970); People v. Shivers, 21
N.Y.2d 118, 233 N.E.2d 836, 286 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1976). Other courts require a showing of
actual physical restraint of one's person. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
defined interrogation to include "words or actions on the part of police officers that they
should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 (emphasis in original). See also, Note, The Meaning of
"Interrogation" Under Miranda v. Arizona: Rhode Island v. Innis; 12 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
725 (1981); Note, The United States Supreme Court Redefines Interrogation for Mi-
randa Purposes, 3 WHIrrER L. REV. 409 (1981).
4. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
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Miranda warnings.' A police officer may now ask questions rea-
sonably necessary to protect public safety.' The responses of the
suspect will be admissible at trial even though the inquiry oc-
curred before Miranda warnings were given.7
Quarles is significant because it establishes the first and
only exception to the clear requirements of Miranda. Quarles
represents a conflict between the fifth amendment's protection
against self-incrimination and a concern for public safety. Part I
of this Note provides background on the Burger Court's inter-
pretation of the eighteen year-old Miranda rule. Part II dis-
cusses the facts of Quarles and analyzes the majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions in Quarles. Part III examines the
rationale of Quarles in light of Miranda and discusses the prac-
tical impact of Quarles. This Note concludes that while the Su-
preme Court's desire to protect public safety is proper, the
Court's characterization of Miranda threatens important fifth
amendment values.
I. Background
A. Legal Background
The means by which police elicit confessions has concerned
the Judiciary since the 1931 Wickersham Commission Report on
police abuses.8 Prior to Miranda v. Arizona,9 however, courts
viewed the fifth amendment as applicable only to courtroom
proceedings. Police interrogations were scrutinized only under
fourteenth amendment due process. The fourteenth amendment
requires a showing that a statement was made voluntarily. °
This fourteenth amendment scrutiny nevertheless reflected a de-
sire to guard against police coercion." It was recognized that co-
5. Id. at 2629.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See 4 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931); Z. CHAFFEE, W. POLLAK & C. STERN, REPORT
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 159 (1931).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). The test for voluntariness
under Rogers is whether on the totality of the circumstances, the suspect's will was over-
borne. Id. at 537.
11. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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ercion can be mental as well as physical and that "the blood of
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition." 2
The Supreme Court attempted to guard against coercion by
extending the sixth amendment right to counsel. In Escobedo v.
Illinois,"3 the Supreme Court held that pretrial interrogation is a
critical stage"4 and that the sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches whenever a criminal investigation "focuses on" a partic-
ular suspect.1 5
Escobedo laid the groundwork and two years later, in Mi-
randa v. Arizona,"6 the Supreme Court announced that custodial
interrogation17 was "inherently coercive."18 In Miranda and its
companion cases, the Supreme Court considered several differ-
ent circumstances each of which shared several salient features.
Each case involved an incommunicado interrogation in a police-
dominated atmosphere. 9 In each case, the interrogation resulted
in self-incriminating statements made by a suspect who had not
been given full warning of his constitutional rights.20 Recogniz-
ing the inherent coercion present in a police interrogation, the
Under the fourteenth amendment, statements made by a criminal suspect are scruti-
nized for "voluntariness." Id. If the suspect's will was "overborne" by the behavior of the
law enforcement officer, any statement obtained from the suspect is in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 546-48 (1961). Courts will
look to the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether a suspect's statement
was involuntary for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Davis v. North Carolina,
384 U.S. 737, 739 (1966).
12. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). See Driver, Confessions and
the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968) (analyzing the effects of
coercion on individual suspects); See also Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda
Project: Interrogations of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967).
The fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause was not formally applied to the
states until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,3 (1964). Prior to Malloy the self-incrimination
clause was only applied in federal prosecutions. Id., passim.
13. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
14. Id. at 490-91.
15. Id. Escobedo further held that admissions made by the accused without the
presence of counsel are inadmissable unless the right to counsel is waived. Id.
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. See supra note 3.
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445-57.
19. Id. at 445.
20. Id. Miranda raised both fifth and sixth amendment issues. The Court reasoned
that the sixth amendment right to counsel was essential to a realistic exercise of the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. Id. at 460-62, 464-66.
3
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Supreme Court created a constitutional presumption that state-
ments made during custodial interrogation are compelled in vio-
lation of the fifth amendment.2 To overcome this presumption,
Miranda required that an individual held for interrogation must
be informed that he has a right to remain silent; that any state-
ments he chooses to make may be used as evidence against him;
that he has the right to have an attorney, and that if he is una-
ble to afford an attorney, an attorney will be appointed upon
request.22 The Miranda decision mandated that the required
warnings are an absolute prerequisite to the admission of any
statements derived from a custodial interrogation.23 Miranda,
therefore, represents a shift from the previous fourteenth
amendment scrutiny. Under Miranda, evidence obtained in vio-
lation of its requirements may not be used against the suspect at
trial.2'
21. Id. at 456-58, 467. See also Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924) (cit-
ing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
22. Id. at 444.
23. Id. Justice Brennan has described the privilege against self-incrimination as
"one of the 'principles of a free government.'" Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964)
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 617, 632 (1886)). For illustrations of this char-
acterization of the privilege in different contexts, see Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415
(1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See also Friendly, The
Fifth Amendment Tommorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV.
671, 679-94 (1968).
24. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), introduced the exclusionary rule that prohibits the introduction of illegally ob-
tained evidence in a federal criminal prosecution. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states. Subsequently, the Su-
preme Court recognized that in order for the exclusionary rule to be effective evidence
obtained both directly and indirectly from an illegal intrusion must be excluded. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). This stems from Justice Frankfurter's man-
date that the Court must exclude the "tainted fruit of the poisonous tree." Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, (1939). The "fruits doctrine" has been applied in both the
fourth and fifth amendment contexts. The Court has applied an attenuation test to de-
termine whether evidence is the fruit of a prior illegality. E.g., Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963).
Recently in Oregon v. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. 4244 (U.S Mar. 4, 1985) the Burger Court
has demonstrated its willingness to erode the fruits doctrine as well as to diminish the
bright-line rule of Miranda. Oregon v. Elstad confirmed the view that "a simple failure
to administer Miranda warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment." 53
U.S.L.W. at 4247 n.1. In Elstad, two police officers went to the home of eighteen year old
Michael Elstad with a warrant for his arrest. Elstad was suspected of assisting in the
burglary of a neighbor's home. After Elstad was "in custody" but prior to being given his
Miranda warnings, he made incriminating statements. This occurred while Elstad was at
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/2
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The Miranda decision evoked much criticism.25 The princi-
ple concern was that set forth in Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion. Justice Harlan feared that Miranda would unduly ham-
per necessary police investigation by dissuading suspects from
admitting pertinent information.2" Despite this criticism, Mi-
his home. He was subsequently taken to the police station where he was read his Mi-
randa rights for the first time. Elstad then signed a written confession. The trial court
allowed the confession into evidence in spite of the respondent's contention that the
confession was the "tainted fruit of the poisionous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. at 487.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. It found that the warnings
given before the second confession were insufficient to dissipate the taint of the earlier
inculpatory statement. State v. Elstad, 61 Ore. App. 673,678, 658 P.2d 552, 555 (1983).
The court explained that in light of the short intervening time period, "the cat was suffi-
ciently out of the bag to exert a coercive impact on the defendant's later admissions." Id.
at 678, 658 P.2d at 555.
After the Oregon Supreme Court declined review, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether "the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment requires the supression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings
and a valid waiver of rights solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary
but unwarned admission from the defendant." Oregon v. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4246.
The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the Oregon Court of Appeals. In a decision
written by Justice O'Connor, the majority adopted basically the same theory propounded
by Justice O'Connor in Quarles. See infra text accompanying notes 81-88. "The Miranda
presumption, though irrebutable for purposes of the prosecution's case-in-chief, does not
require that the statements and their fruits be disgarded as inherently tainted." Oregon
v. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4247. The Court relies on Quarles and Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 444 (1974), to conclude that a simple failure to administer the warnings in
itself taints a suspect's subsequent voluntary and informed waiver. Oregon v. Elstad, 53
U.S.L.W. at 4247. The Court noted the absence of any coercion in obtaining the volun-
tary and informed waiver. Id. at 4247
25. See generally Caplan, Miranda Revisited, 93 YALE L.J. 1375 (1984); Lederer,
Miranda v. Arizona -The Law Today 78 MIL. L. REV. 107 (1978); Robinson, Police and
Prosector Practices and Attitudes Relating to Interrogation as Revealed by Pre-and
Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity to Comply, 1968 DuKE
L.J. 425; Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
645 (1967). See also Note, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 135-41
(1966).
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 516-18 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Stone, The
Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99. But see Chase, The Bur-
ger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 518, 531 (1977) (arguing that the primary intention of Miranda warnings
is not to inform the suspect of his rights but to deter unlawful conduct).
"Among the experts, there is now general agreement that Miranda contained a cen-
tral flaw, an internal contradiction, that greatly diluted its strength: The Court made the
police its messenger .... " Caplan, Miranda Revisited, 93 YALE L.J. 1375, 1381 (1984).
The police have both the duty of persuading the suspect to talk and the conflicting duty
of persuading him to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent. Brief Amicus Cu-
5
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randa became a basic tenet of criminal procedure.27 The Mi-
randa Court specifically rejected the idea that the need for elic-
iting pertinent information could outweigh the privilege against
self-incrimination.
B. Recent Interpretations of Miranda
In cases interpreting and applying the Miranda rule, the
Burger Court has exhibited concerns similar to those of Justice
Harlan's dissent.28 In Beckwith v. United States,29 for example,
the Supreme Court ruled that Miranda warnings were not a pre-
requisite to the admissibility of statements obtained during an
interview conducted by Internal Revenue agents.3 The Court in
Beckwith reasoned that even though the suspect may have been
the "focus" of the investigation, the interview was noncus-
todial.31 Having characterized the interview as noncustodial,32
the Court ruled that Miranda warnings were unnecessary de-
spite the presence of any inherent coercion.33 The Court did,
riae, at 9, People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) (No.
7468) (quoted in Caplan, supra at 1381).
It is interesting to note that Caplan claims there is a consensus among experts ex-
pressing concern over Miranda's alleged failure to adequately protect a criminal sus-
pect's fifth amendment rights. Caplan, supra at 1381. Yet the majority in Quarles has
further abrogated these rights.
27. Miranda has been successful in that it has "curbed the police in their historic
excesses . . .. Suspects are no longer greatly abused but neither is the state losing that
many cases for want of self-incriminating statements. Arguably, it is a reasonable com-
promise." Caplan, supra note 26 at 1383. See also Whitebread & Heilman, Increasing
Our Effectiveness Against Crime: Expanding the Limits of Law Enforcement, 93 YAE
L.J. 1399, 1409 (1984) (this article emphasizes the success of the clearly stated Miranda
rules, pointing out that "the clarity of the Miranda rules allowed police to use the warn-
ings routinely soon after the decision itself, and today few cases are lost as a result of
noncompliance with Miranda.").
28. E.g. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (defining interrogation); Orozco
v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (interpreting the meaning of "in custody"); Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1967) (also interpreting the meaning of "in custody"). See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
30. Id. at 347.
31. Id.
32. Id. This characterization was based on the Court's view that the Internal Reve-
nue Service interview had not within the language of Miranda "deprived [the individual]
of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966).
33. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/2
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however, note that no coercion appeared to be present during
the Internal Revenue Service interview. 4
Another case that reflects the Burger Court's reluctance to
strictly enforce Miranda is Fare v. Michael C.3 5 There, the Su-
preme Court held that a post-Miranda warnings request by a
minor to speak with his probation officer was not an invocation
of his constitutional rights.36 The Court relied on the attorney's
unique role in the criminal justice system.3 7 Although a proba-
tion officer occupies a trusted position, the Court differentiated
that role from the role played by an attorney.3 8
The Burger Court has also limited Miranda to its direct ap-
plication: use of a confession in the case-in-chief to establish
guilt. The Burger Court has sanctioned the use of a confession
that is inadmissible to establish guilt for other purposes. For in-
stance, in Harris v. New York3" and Oregon v. Hass,4 ° the Court
allowed the use of voluntary statements obtained in violation of
Miranda's requirements to impeach a criminal defendant on
cross-examination.41 The Court reasoned that a Miranda viola-
tion is not a license for perjury.43 In the Court's view, to prevent
the use of the unlawfully obtained statements to impeach the
defendant would grant the defendant a windfall.43
In Fletcher v. Weir,4 the Supreme Court again evidenced a
reluctance to strictly apply Miranda. In Fletcher, the Court per-
34. Id. at 348.
35. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
36. Id. at 719.
37. Id. at 721.
38. The Court noted that the probation officer, unlike an attorney would not be in a
position to offer the suspect legal advice sufficient to protect his constitutional rights. Id.
at 722.
39. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
40. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
41. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224.
42. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722-23; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
43. Oregon v. Hass, 429 U.S. at 722-23; Harris v. New York, 420 U.S. at 226. How-
ever, the Court in both Harris and Hass ruled that the prior statements made by the
defendant were voluntary. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
at 225. Under the rule of Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), statements obtained in
violation of Miranda may be admissable to impeach the defendant only insofar as the
statements were made voluntarily. Id. at 398. Any statements obtained involuntarily are
violative of fifth amendment and fourteenth amendment due process and are inadmissi-
ble regardless of the rules of Harris and Hass. Id.
44. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
1985]
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mitted the use of post-arrest silence to impeach the credibility
of a defendant's exculpatory statements at trial.4 The Court
permitted the impeachment through silence even though the de-
fendant had not been given his Miranda warnings.4 6 The Court
reasoned that because Miranda warnings were not given, there
was no inducement to rely on the right to remain silent and that
any post-arrest silence would bear on the veracity of subsequent
exculpatory statements. 41
Of all the Burger Court's interpretations of Miranda, Mich-
igan v. Tucker48 is perhaps the most significant decision prior to
Quarles. In Tucker an interrogation in violation of Miranda re-
sulted in the defendant's identification of an incriminating wit-
ness.4 9 The defendant claimed that the prosecution could not
use the third party testimony because the defendant had not
been given Miranda warnings.50 The Supreme Court allowed the
45. Id. at 607. See also Note, The Fifth Amendment and a Defendant's Prearrest
Failure to Come Forward: The Sounds of Silence, 46 ALB. L. REV. 546 (1982); Note, The
Impeachment Use of Post-Arrest Silence which Preceeds the Reciept of Miranda
Warnings, 73 J. CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1594 (1982).
46. Fletcher v. Weir, 445 U.S. at 604.
47. Id. at 606. This rationale is reminisent of the Supreme Court's rulings in Doyle
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), where post-
arrest silence in circumstances where Miranda warnings had been given was deemed to
be a mere reliance on the right to silence. The silence which the government had induced
could not, therefore, be used to impeach the credibility of the defendant. Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. at 618; United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 177. In Doyle, the Court considered
whether the prosecution could cross-examine a defendant who had remained silent until
trial but at trail offered an alibi. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 611. The Court concluded
that the use of the defendant's silence for impeachment violated due process. Id. at 618.
The Court reasoned that it was unfair to use silence for impeachment because Miranda
impliedly suggests that silence will not be used against the defendant. Id.
In Hale, the defendant, after being read his Miranda rights, refused to answer ques-
tions regarding cash which he was carrying. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 174. The
defendant chose to testify at trial. During cross-examination, he was questioned regard-
ing the fact that he had not offered his alibi to the officers at the time of his arrest. Id.
The Court held that the defendant's silence was not admissible for impeachment. Id. at
180. It reasoned that the defendant's silence was no more than a reliance on his Miranda
rights. Id. at 177.
48. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
49. Id. at 436.
50. Id. at 437. In Tucker, the defendant was arrested prior to the Miranda decision
but tried subsequent to that decision. Id. at 435, 437. Before interrogating the defendant,
the police asked him if he wanted an attorney and advised him that any statements he
made could be used against him in court. Id. at 436. He was not advised that counsel
would be appointed free of charge if he could not afford to hire counsel. Id. The narrow
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/2
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testimony. It characterized Miranda as a guideline, rather than
a hard and fast rule: "the police conduct at issue here did not
abridge [defendant's] constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic
standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard
that privilege. ' 51 It is this characterization of Miranda that set
the foundation for the "public safety" exception expounded in
New York v. Quarles.52
holding in Tucker was limited to the facts of the case and, therefore, it had little prece-
dential effect. Nevertheless, the attitude reflected in the broad language of the opinion is
resurfacing in the Court's recent opinions that quote Michigan v. Tucker with increasing
frequency. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. 4244, 4247 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985); Min-
nesota v. Marshall, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1148 (1984).
51. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46 (emphasis added). See Beale, Reconsid-
ering Supervisory Power In Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1495-96 (1984) (discussing the
prophylactic nature of the Miranda rules).
52. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). Quarles was decided in the midst of not only the Burger
Court's hostility toward Miranda, but toward the exclusionary rule itself. In the fourth
amendment context, a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule was recognized by
the Supreme Court in Leon v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421 (1984), which was
decided shortly after Quarles.
The "good faith" exception recognized in Leon exemplifies another area in which the
Burger Court has determined that protection of a criminal suspect's constitutional rights
can be outweighed by other interests. The Court confirmed the good faith exception in
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). In that opinion, the Court held that
"the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search ac-
ted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid . Id. at 3428. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and Powell previously expressed support for cre-
ating an exception to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 156
n.5 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501-02 (1976) (Burger,
C.J., concurring); Id. at 538, 540-42 (White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 611-12 (1975) (Powell, Rehnquist, J.J., concurring). See Burkoff, Bad Faith
Searches 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 70 n.2 (1982). See generally Ball, Good faith and the
Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 69 J.Cium.
L.& CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978).
In addition, several lower courts recognized a good faith exception prior to Leon. See
United States v. Wilson, 528 F. Supp 1129, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that the good
faith exception barred supression of marijuana where a police officer "arrested" a suspect
outside of his territorial jurisdiction); United States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386, 396-99
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (refusing to suppress evidence when federal agents made a technical
violation of the "knock and announce" rule because the agents had acted in good faith);
United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111
(1981) (barring suppression of evidence obtained from illegal wiretap where agents acted
in good faith).
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II. New York v. Quarles
A. Procedural Background
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Of-
ficers Frank Kraft and Sal Scarring were approached by a young
woman who told them that she had just been raped. 3 The wo-
man described her assailant and told the officers that the assail-
ant was carrying a gun and that he had just entered a nearby
supermarket. 4 While Officer Scarring called for assistance Of-
ficer Kraft entered the supermarket and observed Benjamin
Quarles near the checkout counter. Quarles matched the young
woman's description. Officer Kraft pursued Quarles to the rear
of the supermarket, frisked Quarles and discovered an empty
shoulder holster.5 ' Without reading Quarles his Miranda warn-
ings, Officer Kraft handcuffed Quarles and asked him where the
gun was.5 7 Quarles nodded in the direction of some empty car-
tons and answered "the gun is over there."58 Officer Kraft found
a revolver in one of the empty cartons and then read Quarles his
Miranda rights.59 Quarles stated that he was willing to answer
further questions without an attorney present and admitted that
he owned the revolver.60
Quarles was tried for criminal possession of a weapon. 1 The
trial judge excluded the gun and Quarles' statements about own-
ership because Officer Kraft did not give Quarles his Miranda
warnings before asking where the gun was located.6 2 The appel-
late division" and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed."
53. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct 2626, 2629 (1984).
54. Id. The suspect was described as a Black male, wearing a dark jacket with the
words "Big Ben" emblazoned in yellow letters on the back. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2630.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The state originally charged Quarles with rape but failed to pursue that
charge. The record provides no explanation why the prosecution did not pursue this
charge. Id. at 2630 n.2.
62. Id. at 2630. See also note 23 supra.
63. People v. Quarles, 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S. 2d 84 (2d Dep't, 1981) (mem.),
aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E. 2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2626
(1984).
[Vol. 5:751
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed the court of appeals. 5 The Court held that the need for
public safety outweighed the need for strict adherence to the
rule of Miranda.6
III. The Supreme Court's Decision in Quarles.
A. The Majority
The United States Supreme Court reversed the New York
Court of Appeals and held that the "concern for public safety
must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the
prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda."6 7
To justify the creation of the public safety exception, Jus-
tice Rehnquist applied the following analysis. He began by rely-
ing on Michigan v. Tucker's68 characterization of Miranda warn-
ings as procedural guidelines.6 9 Justice Rehnquist, quoting from
Tucker stated that Miranda warnings are "'not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures
to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
[is] protected.' ",70
Proceeding from this characterization of Miranda warnings
as "prophylactic," Justice Rehnquist made several observations
about the benefits of Miranda warnings. In Justice Rehnquist's
64. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982),
vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that Quarles
was "in custody" within the meaning of Miranda, and that Miranda warnings were a
prerequisite to any questioning. Id. at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521. The
court of appeals rejected the prosecution's contention that public safety excused Officer
Kraft's failure to give Miranda warnings until the gun was located. Id. at 666-67, 444
N.E.2d at 985-86, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521-22. When the court of appeals examined Officer
Kraft's testimony given at the suppression hearing, it found no indication that Officer
Kraft's subjective motivation was to protect his own safety or the safety of the public. Id.
at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
65. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2629.
66. Id. at 2633.
67. New York v. Quarles, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2634 (1984). Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices White, Blackmun, and Powell joined in the majority decision.
68. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). For a brief discussion of this case, see supra notes 48-53
and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 444. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (refering to Miranda warnings as imposing a "general prophylactic rule that
is not manifestly required by anything in the text of the Constitution.).
70. Quarles, 104 S. Ct at 2631 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444).
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view, they prevent coercion, provide clear guidelines, and protect
constitutional rights." In explaining the costs of the Miranda
rule, Justice Rehnquist echoed the concerns expressed in Justice
Harlan's dissent in Miranda. Miranda warnings might deter sus-
pects from answering police interrogation. As a result, it is
feared that there will be fewer convictions of the guilty. 2 The
cost of Miranda warnings becomes greater when the warnings
might deter a suspect from answering questions that are neces-
sary to protect the public safety.7 3 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the costs to public safety outweighed the benefits
of a strict application of Miranda.4
The application of the public safety exception does not de-
pend upon the subjective motivation of the police officers in-
volved.75 Justice Rehnquist expressly held that: "There is a
'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warn-
ings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into
evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not de-
pend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. '76
Turning to the facts of the case, Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that it was appropriate to apply the public safety excep-
tion in Quarles. He noted that there was no claim that the police
compelled Quarles' statements or that Quarles' will to resist had
been overborne.7 7 Moreover, the police did not act out of a con-
cern for their own physical safety.7 8 Nevertheless, the police are
71. Id. at 2633.
72. Id. at 2632. For a discussion of the percieved problems with Miranda see supra
notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
73. Quarles, 104 U.S. at 2632-35.
74. Id. at 2633
75. Id. at 2632.
76. Id. The Court states that the public safety exception "should not be made to
depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motiva-
tion of the arresting officer. Id. at 2633 n.6 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
301 (1980) (officer's subjective intent to incriminate not determinative of whether "inter-
rogation" occurred)). See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 and n.6 (1980)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (officer's subjective intent to deter not determinative of whether
a "seizure" occurred); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 and n.7 (1973) (of-
ficer's subjective fear not determinative of necessity for "search incident to arrest" ex-
ception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment).
77. Id at 2631
78. Id. at 2631. At the time Officer Kraft asked Quarles about the location of the
gun, Quarles was handcuffed and surrounded by at least four officers. Id.
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often confronted with "kaleidoscopic situations" that require
spontaneous reaction.7" When a police officer is confronted with
such a situation, he acts instinctively. In Quarles, Officer Kraft's
instinctive reaction was to ask the only question necessary to lo-
cate the missing gun. As long as the gun was hidden in the su-
permarket, Justice Rehnquist concluded that it posed a danger
to public safety: someone might come across it or an accomplice
might use it.80 This possibility justified applying the new public
safety exception in this case.
B. Justice O'Connor's opinion
Justice O'Connor concurred in the part of the decision to
admit the revolver into evidence, but dissented from the holding
to admit Quarles' statements into evidence. 8 Justice O'Connor
would permit admission of Quarles' revolver into evidence.82 In
her view, nothing in Miranda or the privilege against self-in-
crimination requires exclusion of nontestimonial evidence ac-
quired during custodial interrogation.8
Justice O'Connor criticized the creation of a public safety
exception to Miranda. Although she indicated that she might
not agree wholeheartedly with a strict application of Miranda,
Justice O'Connor stated that it was the law of the land.8 4 Thus,
Justice O'Connor found no justification for the Court's refusal to
apply Miranda. Indeed, she stated that the public safety excep-
tion would obfuscate the bright-line rule of Miranda and pro-
duce "hair-splitting distinctions" that will make the rule more
difficult to understand.' 5 1n Justice O'Connor's view, the Court
missed the critical question to be decided. According to Justice
O'Connor, Miranda does not prohibit the police from asking
79. Id. at 2632.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 2637-38.
83. Id. The Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment does not exclude
nontestimonial, physical evidence. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding
that blood samples are nontestimonial evidence). See also United States v. Dioniso, 410
U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that voice examplars are physical rather than testimonial
evidence).
84. Id. at 2634 ("Were the Court writing from a clean slate, I could agree with its
holding. But Miranda is now the law.
85. Id. at 2636.
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questions that are intended to protect public safety.86 Instead,
by rejecting the idea that society's need for interrogation could
outweigh the privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda,
placed the burden for asking custodial questions on the state. 7
Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that when the police ask
these questions without giving the required warnings, they do so
at the risk of losing probative evidence. 8s
C. The Dissent
In a dissent, Justice Marshall viewed the creation of a pub-
lic safety exception as inconsistent with the rule of Miranda.89
He maintained that Miranda guards against the coercion inher-
ent in custodial interrogation. 0 Justice Marshall characterized
Miranda as a "constitutional presumption" that statements
given during custodial interrogations are coerced. 1 Miranda's
application, therefore, does not depend upon a cost-benefit anal-
ysis.92 Because questions intended to protect public safety are
"no less inherently coercive" than typical investigative ques-
tions, the dissent refused to accept any public safety exception
to Miranda."
Justice Marshall continued his sharp criticism of the public
safety exception by characterizing it as a license for police to
deliberately withhold Miranda warnings.9 The public safety ex-
ception allows police to elicit information from suspects who, if
they had been advised of their Miranda rights, might otherwise
86. Id. at 2636.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Stevens joined in the
dissent authored by Justice Marshall.
90. Id. at 2644. Justice Marshall characterized Miranda as a "century-long inquiry
into how this court should deal with confessions made during custodial interrogations."
Id. at 2646.
91. Id. at 2646. Justice Marshall's corollary to the constitutional presumption is that
a statement made during a custodial interrogation is admissible only if the prosecution
can demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitu-
tional rights before making a statement. Id. at 2646. Note that Justice O'Connor has a
similar viewpoint. See id at 2634-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
92. Id. at 2647-48.
93. Id. at 2647.
94. Id.
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have refused to respond.9 5 Justice Marshall warned that to per-
mit the introduction of statements obtained in response to pub-
lic safety questions would, in fact, invite police coercion.96
Turning to the facts of the case, Justice Marshall argued
that there was no threat to public safety.9 7 At the time of the
interrogation, Quarles was handcuffed and surrounded by four
armed police officers."e The interrogation took place in the early
morning hours and in an empty supermarket.99 The New York
courts determined that, at the time of the interrogation, Officer
Kraft was aware "'with a high degree of certainty'" that the
gun was in the immediate area.100 In these circumstances, Jus-
tice Marshall noted that Officer Kraft undoubtedly could have
cordoned off the supermarket and searched for the gun without
interference. 10 1
Having rejected the application of the public safety excep-
tion, Justice Marshall would remand the case 02 for reconsidera-
tion in light of the "inevitable discovery" rule of Nix v.
Williams. 03
95. Id. To argue that Miranda warnings will discourage responses is tantamount to
an argument that Miranda warnings should be withheld because of the possibility that
they might be invoked.
96. Id. at 2648. The dissent points out that previously coerced confessions were sim-
ply inadmissible in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 2646. Justice Marshall expresses his dis-
agreement with the majority in strong terms, stating:
[Tihe "public-safety" exception departs from this principle by expressly inviting
police officers to coerce defendants into making incriminating statements, and
then permitting prosecutors to introduce those statements at trial. Though the
majority's opinion is cloaked in the beguiling language of utilitarianism, the Court
has sanctioned sub silentio criminal prosecutions based on compelled self-incrimi-
nating statements I find this result in direct conflict with the Fifth Amendment's
dictate that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself."
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
97. Id. at 2644.
98. Id. at 2642.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2643 (quoting Brief for Appellent at 11, People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664,
444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982) (No. 2512-80).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2650.
103. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984). Nix v. Williams permits the introduction of unlawfully
obtained evidence if it is shown that the evidence would have been discovered by other
means. Id. at 2509. The rationale of the "inevitable discovery" doctrine is that the police
should not be put in a worse position than they would have been but for the illegality.
Id. For a discussion of the inevitable discovery doctrine see, Note, Nix v. Williams: Con-
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IV. Analysis
New York v. Quarles'0 4 represents the Supreme Court's
struggle with linked but opposed principles. On one hand, there
is a desire to guard the public from those involved in criminal
activity. On the other hand, there is a desire to preserve fifth
and sixth amendment interests. Quarles announces that in cer-
tain circumstances the price of protecting civil liberties is too
great. In a typical Miranda situation, the price of enforcement
of fifth amendment rights is that a guilty person may go free. In
a Quarles situation, not only might the guilty go free but an
identifiable threat to public safety remains unabated. In earlier
cases, the Burger Court has manifested its hostility toward the
potential of a guilty suspect going free. In Harris v. New York 0 5
and Oregon v. Hass, 06 the Court feared that a defendant would
be given a windfall because of the "constable's blunder.' 0 7 Yet,
until Quarles, the Supreme Court did not carve out an exception
to Miranda. The simplest explanation of Quarles is that the
rights of society need greater protection. A concern .for public
safety, coupled with the fear that the guilty may go free, inspires
hostility to Miranda. Quarles demonstrates compassion to the
potential victims of crime yet apathy to the rights of criminal
suspects. Quarles should be praised for its concern for the public
welfare but criticized for its disregard of Miranda's fundamental
principles.
A. The Dilemma of Police Officers
Justice Rehnquist correctly recognizes that when a threat to
public safety exists, the police officer is faced with a dilemma. 108
If an officer withholds Miranda warnings in order to elicit infor-
mation to protect the public safety, he violates Miranda and
jecture Enters the Exclusionary Rule, 5 PACE L. REV. 657 (1985).
Justice Marshall did not comment on Justice O'Connor's "novel" concurring opin-
ion. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2649 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
105. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
106. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
107. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
"The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Id. at 21, 150 N.E. at
587.
108. See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
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probative evidence will be unavailable. 19 If, however, an officer
advises a criminal suspect of his Miranda rights, the probability
that the suspect will invoke his right to silence increases. This,
in turn, increases the probability that a threat to public safety
will remain." 0 This dilemma represents a conflict between the
fifth amendment and public safety. In a larger sense it repre-
sents a general conflict between civil liberties and crime
prevention.'
The public safety exception is an attempt to extricate the
police from this dilemma." 2 Without giving Miranda warnings,
a police officer may now conduct a limited public safety inquiry
without jeopardizing the admissibility of probative evidence.
The public safety exception, therefore, is credible in that it pro-
tects two police interests. First, it protects the interest in ade-
quate preservation of public safety. Second, it protects the pro-
curement of probative evidence in criminal investigations.
What is troubling about the public safety exception is that
it resolves the police officer's dilemma by formulating a rule that
is weighted entirely in the police officer's favor. The public
safety exception protects the police interests at the expense of
the criminal suspect's Miranda rights. It abridges the rights of
the accused during this custodial interrogation. It is in this light
that Justice O'Connor's novel approach" 3 is laudatory.
Justice O'Connor and Justice Marshall correctly criticize
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Justice Marshall is not troubled by this dilemma because he does not view the
privilege against self-incrimination as an obstacle to protecting public safety.
The irony of the majority's decision is that the public's safety can be perfectly
well protected without abridging the Fifth Amendment. If a bomb is about to
explode or the public is otherwise imminently imperiled, the police are free to
interrogate suspects without advising them of their constitutional rights. Such un-
contested questioning may take place not only when police officers act on instinct
but also when higher faculties lead them to believe that advising a suspect of his
constitutional rights might decrease the likelihood that the suspect would reveal
life-saving information. If trickery is necessary to protect the public, then the po-
lice may trick a suspect into confessing. While the Fourteenth Amendment sets
limits on such behavior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or our decision in Mi-
randa v. Arizona proscribes this sort of emergency questioning. All the Fifth
Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at trial.
Id. at 2648 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2633.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 104-107.
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the majority for imposing the cost of ensuring public safety on
the suspect." 4 Justice O'Connor's view of Miranda as imposing
on the police rather than the suspect the cost of ensuring public
safety" 5 finds support in the rationale of Miranda. The Mi-
randa warnings put an affirmative obligation on the police. The
public safety exception now weakens that obligation. Although
Justice Marshall's dissent, characterizes Justice O'Connor's
opinion as "novel,"'1 6 the dissent's characterization of Miranda
as a "constitutional presumption"'"1 7 is entirely consistent with
Justice O'Connor"s approach. Both Justice O'Connor's theory
and Justice Marshall's "constitutional presumption" theory im-
pose the burden of preserving safety on the police. The Miranda
rights of the criminal suspect are not balanced away. In contrast,
the majority by creating a public safety exception permits the
preservation of public safety at the expense of the criminal
suspect."'
In light of the Miranda precedent, the opinions of Justice
O'Connor and Justice Marshall appear to be more credible. The
majority carves out an exception to Miranda based on a fear
that the rights given under Miranda will actually be invoked."'
A suspect who received Miranda warnings is more likely to in-
voke his right to silence and perhaps prevent the police from
eliminating a threat to public safety.' To argue that Miranda
warnings threaten safety because they may be invoked, flouts
the rationale of the Miranda decision. In those situations in
114. Id.
115. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
116. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2649, n. 11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 119-26. Statements obtained as a result of
custodial interrogation are, under Miranda, presumed coerced and held violative of the
fifth amendment. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2646-47; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478.
118. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Id. at 2645-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2647.
120. Id. For studies regarding the practical impact of Miranda, see Witt, Non-Coer-
cive Interrogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda
on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973); Leiken, Police Interro-
gation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1 (1970); MEDALIE,
FEITZ & ALEZANDER, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The At-
tempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Mi-
randa in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 U. PriT. L.REv. 1 (1967); Special Pro-
ject, Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
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which there is a need to act quickly to preserve the public
safety, Justice O'Connor and Justice Marshall would impose the
burden of public safety on the police. This imposition is no
greater than that already imposed by Miranda. Sometimes a
criminal suspect may go free in order to protect the right against
self-incrimination, a right that is fundamental to our constitu-
tional system. If it is also necessary to release a criminal suspect
in order to ensure that a threat to public safety is eliminated,
this would pose no greater burden on the police than Miranda
already imposes.
Nevertheless, if one examines Quarles in light of social and
moral concerns, rather than a specific Miranda analysis, the ba-
sis of the majority opinion is evident. Society is more able to
accept that any costs of preserving public safety be imposed on
criminals and criminal suspects rather than on law enforcement
officials. Social compassion favors law-abiding citizens and often
ignores criminals and criminal suspects. This is not to argue that
there are no social and moral concerns reflected in Miranda.12'
Indeed, our view is quite the contrary. Miranda warnings are
necessary to protect the interests of a criminal suspect. Prevail-
ing social concerns might demonstrate, however, that a law-abid-
ing citizen has nothing to lose from the minimal intrusion of a
public safety inquiry.'2 2 Indeed, if the benefit of allowing such
an intrusion is to ensure public safety and prevent crime, then
one can see the basis of the majority's opinion.
This justification, however, is outweighed by Justice
O'Connor's and Justice Marshall's criticism. This criticism of
121. Miranda seeks to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings. In
this regard Miranda reflects a concern for the preservation of free choice. Miranda 384
U.S. at 446-48. By requiring that interrogation must cease when an individual indicates
that he wishes to remain silent, Miranda also reflects a concern that an individual's
choice should be enforced. Miranda at 473-74.
122. That a "minimal intrusion" may be accepted at the expense of constitutional
rights has been accepted in fourth amendment cases. E.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (stop and frisk cases); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (automobile stops);
Camaera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches); United
States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (airport searches).
The imposition of airport searches including the use of metal detectors best exem-
plifies the social concerns underlying Quarles. Passengers are willing to accept this intru-
sion in order to guard against the possibility of a skyjacking or an act of terrorism. A
vast majority of travelers would undergo these intrusions rather than forego them and
board an airplane where no safety precautions have been taken.
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Quarles is anchored in a strict application of Miranda. The ma-
jority's creation of a public safety exception, sounds in more
general social and moral concerns. This exemplifies the funda-
mental conflict between public safety and fifth amendment in-
terests and explains why some of the justices differ over the res-
olution of the police officer's dilemma. The best example of this
conflict is found in Justice O'Connor's opinion. If the Court were
writing on a "clean slate," she would concur in the creation of a
public safety exception.123 However, Miranda is the law and Jus-
tice O'Connor felt constrained by the protection it affords fifth
amendment interests. 124
B. The Characterization of Miranda Warnings as Procedural
Guidelines
The majority in New York v. Quarles125 relied heavily on
Michigan v. Tucker's12 6 pronunciation that Miranda warnings
are only prophylactic, procedural guidelines.1 27 The majority
maintained that Miranda warnings are not themselves constitu-
tionally protected rights.128 Instead, the majority maintained
that Miranda warnings are measures to ensure that constitu-
tional rights are protected. 29 This characterization is the most
disturbing aspect of the Quarles decision.
To characterize Miranda warnings as merely "procedural"
separates constitutional rights from their means of enforcement.
The substantive entitlements of the fifth and sixth amendments
are only as valuable as their method of enforcement. Fifth and
sixth amendment rights could not be adequately protected if
their enforcement was dependent on whether a criminal suspect
had the foresight to invoke them. This is a principal reason why
the Miranda court required the police to issue warnings. 130 The
invocation of constitutional rights should not depend on the age,
123. Quarles, 104 Sup. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
124. Id.
125. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
126. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 460-62.
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experience, education or social status of the criminal suspect."' 1
Implicit in the holding of Miranda, therefore, is a determination
that substantive fifth and sixth amendment rights are inextrica-
bly interwoven with their means of enforcement. The procedural
guidelines theory of Michigan v. Tucker and of the Quarles ma-
jority disregards this rationale of Miranda.
The majority in Quarles purports to leave fifth and sixth
amendment substantive entitlements unscathed. It is only the
procedural guidelines that the majority claims to narrow. 2 Nev-
ertheless, to subtract from the means of enforcement of any sub-
stantive right, is to weaken the substantive entitlement itself. A
substantive right without a means for enforcement is rendered
meaningless. Indeed, if Miranda warnings are not constitutional
safeguards then they have no other genesis.13 3 The "procedural
guidelines" characterization is not based on a strict Miranda
analysis but is better explained as a reflection of the Burger
Court's hostility toward Miranda.
The Burger Court has repeatedly expressed a dissatisfaction
with the fact that in certain circumstances, Miranda may re-
quire that a guilty person goes free. In Beckwith v. United
States," the Court expressed its hostility toward Miranda by
narrowing the definition of the "custodial interrogations" to
which Miranda applies. 13 5 In Fare v. Michael C.,1 36 the Court
expressed its hostility toward Miranda by limiting the types of
131. Id. at 468.
132. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2630-31.
133. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 462 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "The
Court is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a constitutional
basis." Id.
134. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
135. Id. at 347 (defining an Internal Revenue Service interview as non-custodial).
See supra text accompanying notes 29-34. Within the language of Miranda, a suspect
was " in custody" when he has "been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. Beck-
with narrowed this definition by holding that an Internal Revenue Service interview
which focused on the suspect was noncustodial. Under Beckwith in order to determine
whether one is in custody a detailed assessment of the "nature and setting of [the] in
custody interrogation" is required. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 346 (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445). For a discussion of what constitutes a custodial
interrogation see supra note 3.
136. 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (a request to speak to one's probation officer is not an
invocation of one's sixth amendment rights). See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
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requests which would invoke a suspect's Miranda rights. 137 In
addition, in Harris v. New York 3s and Oregon v. Hass13 9 the
Court permitted the indirect use of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda by allowing the use of such evidence to impeach
the defendant's credibility at trial.14 0 Finally, in Fletcher v.
Weir,"' the Court allowed the use of post-arrest silence to im-
peach a defendant who had never been informed of his Miranda
rights."12 This pattern of resentment to the Miranda rule, in-
cluding the Tucker "procedural guidelines" theory, blazed the
path for the first exception to the Miranda rule. The Quarles
public safety exception caps the Burger Court's contempt with
the rule of Miranda. This contempt explains Quarles failure to
recognize Miranda as a constitutional privilege.141
The opinion in Michigan v. Tucker,"' however, suggests
that the "procedural guidelines" theory was not intended to be
137. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 727-28.
138. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris the defendant's statement was taken in violation
of Miranda. Id. at 222. The prosecution conceded that these statements were inadmissi-
ble in its case-in-chief. Id. However, the defendant chose to testify in his own behalf and
during his testimony the defendant denied any criminal conduct. Id. at 273. On cross
examination, the prosecution asked the defendant about his prior inconsistent state-
ment. Id. The Supreme Court allowed the use of the statement to impeach the defendant
even though those statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. Id. at 225-26.
139. 420 U.S. 714 (1975). In Hass, the defendant's request for an attorney was not
honored. Id. at 716. The defendant then made inculpatory statements. Id. Later the de-
fendant chose to testify in his own behalf. Id. Because the inculpatory statements were
concededly inadmissable on the prosecutions case-in-chief, the defendant on direct ex-
amination denied these statements. Id. The Supreme Court allowed the use of these
statements to impeach the defendant even though here, as in Harris, the statements
were obtained in violation of Miranda. Id. at 722-24
140. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris v. New York,401 U.S. at 224.
141. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam). In Weir, the defendant was charged with
murder. Id. at 663. These charges arose out of a fight which occurred in a nightclub
parking lot between the defendant, Weir and one Ronnie Buchanan. Id. During the
course of the fight, Buchanan pinned Weir to the ground. Id. Buchanan suddenly
jumped up shouting that he had been stabbed. Id. He ultimately died from the stab
wounds. Id. Weir left the scene and never reported the incident. Id. At the time of his
arrest, Weir, who was not given his Miranda warnings, did not offer any exculpating
information. At trial, Weir testified in his own behalf and offered an alibi. The prosecu-
tor cross-examined Weir with regard to his failure to offer his alibi at the time of his
arrest. Id. The Supreme Court permitted this use of Weir's post-arrest silence. Id. at 607.
The Court reasoned that the police had not induced Weir's silence. Id. at 606.
142. Id. at 604-05.
143. 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2645-47 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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extended. In Tucker the defendant was informed of his Miranda
rights except for his right to have counsel appointed in the event
that he could not afford counsel."4 5 The defendant in Tucker ex-
pressly stated that he was willing to answer questions in the ab-
sence of counsel, and therefore the failure to inform him of his
right to appointed counsel was not viewed as an egregious er-
ror."6 This situation can be readily distinguished from Quarles
where the public safety interrogation took place in the absence
of any Miranda warnings. Furthermore, the interrogation in
Tucker occurred prior to the Miranda decision. The officers
clearly complied with Escobedo v. Illinois,1 7 the prevailing stan-
dard at the time. The very facts of Tucker, therefore, suggest
that its procedural guidelines theory was created as a result of
an ad hoc desire to prevent a guilty suspect from going free. It
should not have been extended.
Beckwith, Fare, Tucker, Harris, and Hass all reflect the
Court's hostility to the burden Miranda places on law enforce-
ment. In a particular case, a guilty defendant may go free even if
the purpose and flagrancy of the Miranda violation was not sub-
stantial. The hostility evidenced in these cases might have led
one to predict the result in Quarles but does not serve as a justi-
fication of the result in Quarles.
C. The Facts and Circumstances in Quarles
In creating its public safety exception, the Quarles majority
stressed the necessity of finding the missing revolver.1' 8 Never-
theless, a close analysis of the facts and circumstances present in
Quarles suggests that the threat to public safety was not suffi-
cient to warrant the creation of the public safety exception.
More specifically, the public was not in danger at the time
Quarles was interrogated.
At the time of the questioning, Quarles was handcuffed and
surrounded by four police officers. 49 Quarles had been "reduced
145. Id. at 438.
146. Id. at 436.
147. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
148. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
149. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2630.
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to a condition of physical powerlessness."' 50 The officers had no
subjective or objective belief that Quarles had an accomplice. 15'
The officers had enough confidence to put their guns in their
holsters. 52 As Officer Kraft acknowledged: "[tihe situation was
under control.' 153 Those facts suggest that the officers were in
no apprehension of danger to their own safety.
Turning to the officers' concern for the public's safety, the
missing gun again posed no threat. Though the supermarket was
open to the public, Quarles' arrest took place at 12:30 a.m. when
the store was deserted." No employees or customers were wan-
dering about the store; there was no danger of anyone discover-
ing the missing gun. 55 The officers could have easily conducted
a search for the gun. 56 Because the officers were aware with a
"high degree of certainty that the defendant's gun was within
the immediate vicinity of the encounter,' 5 7 the officers harbored
a reasonable belief that a search could uncover the gun before
any customers or employees would. Most significant, it was not
likely that anyone would have been injured during the few
seconds that it would have taken to inform Quarles of his Mi-
randa rights. Furthermore, it is possible that Quarles would
have responded to questions regarding the location of the gun
even after he was issued his Miranda warnings. If Quarles was
indeed dissuaded from responding, the store could have been
cleared and searched.
Quarles exemplifies a situation in which there was a possi-
bility of harm to the public. Nevertheless, the probability that
any harm would result was minute. Quarles, therefore, sanctions
a public safety exception when the danger to the public is in-
deed tenuous. Quarles also neglects to consider the degree to
which Miranda warnings would actually effect the threat to pub-
lic safety.' In addition, uncomplicated and feasible police pro-
150. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 667, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522, 444 N.E.2d 984,
986 (quoted in Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
151. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 986, 458 N.Y.t.2d at 521.
154. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2629; id at 2643 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2648 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Id. (emphasis omitted).
158. In fact, Quarles did waive his right to silence and continued to answer the of-
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cedures could have eliminated the chance of harm to the public.
The facts and circumstances present in Quarles did not indicate
a threat to public safety that was so immediate or unavoidable
as to warrant creating a public safety exception.
D. The Motivation of the Police Officers
The majority in Quarles concluded that the creation of a
public safety exception did not require consideration of the mo-
tivation of the police officer.159 The majority maintained that po-
lice officers effectuating arrests were confronted with "kaleido-
scopic" situations'6 0 and that the application of a public safety
exception should not depend upon a post hoc examination of the
officer's subjective motivation.' The majority put faith in the
police officer's ability to act instinctively when effectuating an
arrest. 62 This reliance on the officer's instinctive conduct does
not give adequate consideration to the officer's subjective moti-
vation. The Court is suggesting that an officer on the beat will
instinctively be able to determine when the public safety is at
risk. But even the Supreme Court, with the advantage of hind-
sight, could not agree whether public safety was significantly
threatened in Quarles. The Court's reliance on the individuals
officer's instinct seems unrealistic and impractible.
The majority sets forth an objective test for the motivation
of the police officer. The public safety exception is available
when police officers ask questions "reasonably prompted by a
ficer's questions after he was given his Miranda rights. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2630. Sur-
prisingly, there is a very high incidence of waiver of the right to remain silent and the
right to counsel. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1395-96
(1968); Special Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE
L. J. 1519, 1570-71 (1967).
Various theories have been advanced to explain why so many criminal suspects act
contrary to their own self-interest by waiving the constitutional protections afforded
them. First, it has been suggested that suspects may confess as a remedial act to placate
their moral conscience. See Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables,
93 YALE L.J. 455, 477-78 (1984). Second, suspects may not understand their rights. See
Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra, at 1394-95. Concedely this theory is less persuasive
because Miranda has become a household word.
159. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
160. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
161. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
162. Id. at 2633.
1985]
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
concern for the public safety."' 3 In adopting this objective test,
the majority expressly precludes consideration of the police of-
ficer's subjective motivation."' The objective standard avoids
the need for an examination of subjective motivation but per-
mits potential abuse of the public safety exception.
A post hoc scrutiny of a police officer's subjective motiva-
tion would inherently be speculative and inconclusive. On re-
view, a court could not adequately assess an officer's experiences,
biases and prejudices or any other factors that might determine
his motivation. Consequently a subjective standard might cause
the public safety exception to be applied on the basis of conjec-
ture. Nevertheless, even under the objective standard, a post hoc
scrutiny is not entirely avoided. A reviewing court will need to
assess the facts and circumstances in order to determine
whether the threat to public safety warranted a limited inquiry
in the absence of Miranda warnings. The crucial distinction here
is that a court may more readily determine the objective percep-
tion of a public danger than it may determine an officer's subjec-
tive motivation. It seems, however, that some type of subjective
standard is necessary in order to prevent abuse of the public
safety exception.
Conceivably, there may be situations in which police officers
will act in bad faith in order to take advantage of the public
safety exception. Police officers might wait for a criminal suspect
to act so that he poses a public danger rather than apprehend
the suspect immediately. If, in anticipation of a limited inquiry
without Miranda warnings, the police postpone the immediate
apprehension of a criminal suspect, the public safety exception
becomes a vehicle for those acting in bad faith to circumvent
Miranda. Furthermore, if the public safety exception actually
encourages delay in apprehension, the exception may foster a
danger to public safety. Immediate apprehension of the criminal
suspect minimizes any potential threat to public safety. If, how-
ever, an officer hopes to take advantage of an interrogation with-
out Miranda warnings, he might allow a threat to public safety
to materialize. Thus, in the absence of any inquiry into the sub-
jective motivation of the police officer, the Quarles exception
163. Id. at 2632.
164. Id.
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could conceivably lead to a threat to public safety.
The possibility of abuse of the Quarles exception by those
attempting to circumvent Miranda could be prevented by predi-
cating the exception on a showing that the police officer acted in
good faith. The Quarles exception only permits a limited inquiry
into the purpose of preserving public safety. Nevertheless, even
such a limited inquiry is likely to uncover probative evidence of
a criminal suspect's guilt. The narrow scope of the inquiry,
therefore, is not sufficient in itself to deter bad faith abuses of
the Quarles exception. The objective standard imposed by the
majority already requires some post hoc scrutiny of the facts and
circumstances. An additional requirement of good faith would
not significantly add to the burden of a reviewing court. A court
would need only to weigh the facts and circumstances to deter-
mine a threshold requirement of good faith. A court would not
need to examine all possible experiences, biases and prejudices
of an individual police officer. Therefore, the need to resort to
speculation or conjecture would not arise. The imposition of a
good faith threshold would not unduly burden a reviewing court
and would more fully protect against abuse of the public safety
exception.
E. The Impact of Quarles
The majority's holding in New York v. Quarles'65 sacrifices
clarity and guidance in favor of enhanced protection of public
safety. The majority opinion noted that the exception would
lessen "desirable clarity"' 66 and that the scope of the exception
will be determined by the "exigency which justifies it.' 67 Be-
cause the public safety exception turns on an examination of the
facts and circumstances at the time of the interrogation it fails
to provide adequate guidance to the lower courts or to police
officers. Justice O'Connor's observation that Quarles will result
in "hair-splitting" ad hoc determinations is correct. 6 8
First, Quarles will result in "hair-splitting" determinations
regarding whether an actual threat to public safety exists. In
165. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
166. Id. at 2633.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Quarles the danger to public safety was equated with the exis-
tence of an undiscovered revolver. It remains to be seen what
other situations will also be deemed a threat to public safety.
Quarles does not suggest whether or to what extent the severity
of the threat to public safety is a factor. Under Quarles an unac-
counted for deadly weapon constitutes a threat to public
safety. 169 The existence of other contraband, however, may not
pose a similar threat. Perhaps, a quantity of drugs or narcotics
might, if unaccounted for, pose a public danger. 170  The
probability of discovery by another criminal, a child, or an un-
witting citizen may be a factor. 171 Perhaps the mere existence of
an unapprehended accomplice to a violent crime or a repetitive
pattern of violent crimes may constitute a threat to public
safety. It is apparent that, under the Quarles test, tenuous ad
hoc distinctions are unavoidable.
Second, Quarles will result in hairsplitting determinations
regarding whether the interrogation is coercive. The majority in
Quarles rested its decision in part upon a finding that there was
no coercion in fact.172 A showing of actual coercion would, even
169. Although the Court states that it is "recognizing a narrow exception to Mi-
randa," id. at 2633, the Court has in fact created a broad exception by selecting this fact
pattern upon which to recognize a public safety exception. Nothing in the case indicates
that the police, or any other person, were in imminent danger. The New York Court of
Appeals decision points out the lack of foundation for finding that the public's safety
was at risk:
There is no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circumstances
posing a risk to the public safety or that the-police interrogation was prompted by
any such concern. Nor, so far as it appears from the record, was any such theory
advanced by the People at the suppression hearing. Undeniably, neither of the
courts below, with fact-finding jurisdiction, made any factual determination that
the police acted in the interest of public safety.
People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521-22.
170. By creating a public safety exception in this instance, the Court is opening the
door for lower courts to interpret this decision to mean the public safety exception may
be invoked whenever there is a possibility of danger to the public.
171. Analysis of the facts and circumstances of Quarles, however, seems to negate
the probability of public discovery from significant consideration. See supra text accom-
panying notes 154-57.
172. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631. All statements given in response to police interro-
gation must satisfy the fourteenth amendment requirement of voluntariness. E.g. Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966). Miranda
specifically addressed the inherent coercion in custodial interrogation. See supra text
accompanying notes 16-27. The question remains, however, whether courts will tolerate a
degree of coercion in order to protect public safety. When necessary to protect public
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/2
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under the majority's view, warrant exclusion of the evidence. 7 3
Thus, Quarles requires that lower courts also resort to ad hoc
determinations of whether there had been coercion in fact. The
Supreme Court was well aware that the decision in Quarles pro-
vided little in the way of clarity and guidance.17 4 The Court was,
however, willing to accept this result in order to protect public
safety.
V. Conclusion
If the Supreme Court had not been bound by the rule of
Miranda v. Arizona,1 75 social and moral concerns might warrant
the creation of a public safety exception. However, in light of
Miranda, the public safety exception announced in New York v.
Quarles17 6 is unwarranted. Particularly disturbing is the Court's
characterization of Miranda warnings as "guidelines" rather
than constitutional rights. Furthermore, assuming the propriety
of a public safety exception, it does not follow that the facts and
circumstances present in Quarles necessitated the creation of
such an exception.
Specifically addressing the public safety exception as cre-
ated in Quarles, any such exception must consider the subjective
motivation of the police officers. A threshold showing that the
police acted in good faith would help to protect against abuse of
the Quarles exception.
Cynthia K. Fichera
Philip Quaranta
safety, the Quarles exception acquiesces in the inherent coercion identified in Miranda.
Nevertheless, the majority in Quarles stated that a showing of actual coercion would
warrant exclusion of evidence. Quarles 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5, 2633 n.7.
173. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5, 2633 n.7.
174. Id. at 2633.
175. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
176. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
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